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BEING FORCED TO CODE IN THE TECHNOLOGY
ERA AS A VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION AGAINST COMPELLED SPEECH
Adrianna Oddo+
On December 2, 2015, fourteen people were killed and twenty-one others
were wounded when two assailants opened fire at the Inland Regional Center in
San Bernardino, California.1 Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik fired
sixty-five to seventy-five rounds in the center before fleeing the scene.2 Law
enforcement received a tip about the suspects’ location, which resulted in a
police chase.3 Following a shootout with the police, both suspects were killed
and, “[t]he FBI investigated the mass shooting as an ‘act of terrorism’ and
determined that the two killers were not part of any terrorist network or cell. . .
.”4 During its investigation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
discovered the shooters’ broken cell phones and it appeared as though the
shooters attempted to destroy their digital fingerprints.5 The massacre forced
the nation to focus on terrorism and gun policy, but it later shed light on a more
technical issue.6
In February 2015, two months into its investigation, the FBI encountered a
problem accessing the information on the shooters’ phones.7 The FBI director
informed Congress that after two months the FBI could not unlock the terrorists’
phones despite diligent efforts to circumvent Apple, Incorporated’s (Apple)
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1. Larisa Epatko, Everything We Know About the San Bernardino Shooting, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Dec. 3, 2015, 9:27 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/everything-we-kno
w-about-the-san-bernardino-shooting/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to San
Bernardino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-used-by-san-bernardinoshooter/2016/02/
16/69b903ee-d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html; see generally Jim Finkle & Dustin Volz,
U.S. Tech Companies Unite Behind Apple Ahead of Iphone Encryption Ruling In re Search of Apple
iPhone, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/apple-encryption-google-faceb
ook-idUSKCN0W527Y.
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encryption technology.8 The United States Department of Justice sought to
obtain this information by ordering Apple to “disable the feature that wipes data
on [an iPhone] after 10 incorrect tries at entering a password.”9 Apple
vehemently resisted the Justice Department’s order and the American public
became divided over the legal implications of technology, privacy, and
encryption.10 Apple CEO, Tim Cook, expressed concerns and explained his
dissent to the Justice Department’s order in a letter to Apple customers.11
Cook’s main concern with rewriting encryption software was that it would create
a “chilling” effect on the privacy of Apple consumers.12 Apple bases its
opposition on two arguments. The government does not have authority under
the All Writs Act of 1789 to force Apple to unlock its phones, and compelling
Apple to violate its company philosophy infringes on the right against compelled
speech.13
Apple committed itself to do everything possible to protect customers’ data
and personal information.14 To achieve this, Apple uses encryption software to
protect the vast amounts of information consumers store on their iPhones and
has additionally “put that data out of [its] own reach, because [it] believe[s] the
contents of your iPhone are none of [its] business.”15 While the theory behind
data encryption is good for consumers and their personal information, it presents
a problem for law enforcement that may need to gain access to devices for
8. Dustin Volz & Mark Hosenball, FBI Director Says Investigators Unable to Unlock San
Bernardino Shooter’s Phone Content, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/uscalifornia-shooting-encryption-idUSKCN0VI22A.
9. Nakashima, supra note 7.
10. Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, Apple Fights Order to Unlock San Bernardino Gunman’s
iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/technology/appletimothy-cook-fbi-san-bernardino.html. The divide even extends to the Obama administration itself
where “some of the president’s most senior aides are staking out a variety of positions on the issue.”
Although the administration repeatedly stated there is no “serious internal disagreement about
policy,” the actions of agency officials, such as the Director of the FBI and the Defense Secretary,
indicate conflicting positions. Michael D. Shear & David E. Sanger, Competing Interests on
Encryption Divide Top Obama Officials, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/03/06/us/politics/competing-interests-on-encryption-divide-top-obama-officials.html.
11. Lichtblau & Benner, supra note 10; Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE
(Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/; Answers to your questions about Apple
and security, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/answers/ (last viewed Oct. 17, 2017).
12. Cook, supra note 11.
13. Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search,
and Opposition to Government’s Motion To Compel Assistance, at 14–15, 33–34, In re the Search
of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300,
California License Plate 35KGD203 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) (No. CM 16-10), 2016 WL 767457
[hereinafter Apple Inc.’s Motion To Vacate Order]; Adam Satariano, Apple-FBI Fight Asks: is
Code Protected as Free Speech?, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-02-24/apple-fbi-fight-asks-is-code-protected-as-free-speech.
14. Cook, supra note 11.
15. Id.; see also Apple, Inc., iOS Security (May 2016), https://www.apple.com/business/docs
/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf.
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investigations.16 After recognizing the issue that encryption presents, the
government sought access to these devices by, among other routes, compelling
Apple to write a “backdoor” to the iPhone through a court order.17 Compelling
companies to write new software for their products has First Amendment
implications that courts need to address; however, every case that has made it to
court has been dismissed before a ruling can be issued.18 Without a decision or
definitive answer regarding these investigations, consumers are unaware that the
privacy, security, and safety of their devices may not be protected.19
Using a court order to compel Apple—or any company—to assist in an
investigation is not necessarily illegal and alone does not violate any of the
company’s rights. But requiring Apple to create a backdoor to its software—
something it is fervently and fundamentally opposed to—may violate the
company’s rights.20 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”21
Since the First Amendment’s passage in the late 1700s, American law has
shaped and defined the protections and guarantees of the First Amendment.22
Due to recent technological advancements, courts have held that computer code
is speech and have provided guidance on the degree of protection that computer
code is afforded.23 Courts have also addressed ancillary speech matters, such as
compelled speech and compelled affirmations, which further contemplate the
nature of protections afforded to computer code as a matter of constitutional
law.24 The technological advancements of Apple’s encryption software and the
unique conundrum presented by attempting to gain access to their devices
warrant an evaluation of the First Amendment in this context.25 This evaluation
is necessary not only with regard to an order creating a backdoor to Apple’s
product, but also with regard to requiring Apple to authorize the program to
function on its devices despite Apple’s fundamental opposition to everything
that program stands for.26
16. Jeff John Roberts, Locked Apple Devices are Piling Up in Police Evidence Rooms,
FORTUNE (Nov. 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/11/17/locked-apple-devices-are-piling-up-inpolice-evidence-rooms/.
17. Cook, supra note 11.
18. Satariano, supra note 13.
19. See generally Cook, supra note 11 (describing uncertainty and availability of data
protection without definite legal precedent).
20. Satariano, supra note 13; Cook, supra note 11.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22. See generally About the First Amendment, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/aboutthe-first-amendment (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (tracing the history of shaping and defining the
protections guaranteed by the First Amendment).
23. Satariano, supra note 13.
24. See generally About the First Amendment, supra note 22 (describing ancillary speech
matters covered by the courts).
25. Satariano, supra note 13.
26. Id.; see generally Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 13, at 1–3.
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Not all speech is afforded the same protection under the First Amendment.27
Cases throughout the past 200 years have determined what speech is and is not
protected in addition to how much protection is actually given. Courts must
ultimately consider the critical distinctions between pure speech and expressive
conduct regarding whether computer code is speech.28 With respect to questions
regarding computer code, courts must further distinguish whether the speech in
question is source code or object code.29 Another caveat to the First Amendment
is the fundamental right of the American people to be protected from
government compulsion of any kind of speech.30 Previous decisions
surrounding computer code and compelled speech serve as a framework to
analyze cases that arise due to recent technological advancements.
This Note discusses why, under First Amendment law, Apple should not be
required to create code that circumvents its encryption software to assist the FBI
in obtaining information stored on legally seized Apple products. It begins with
a description of the relevant law surrounding the development of the Free Speech
doctrine in regards to computer code. This Note then analyzes the distinctions
the courts have recognized between source code and object code when assigning
proper constitutional protections. Next, this Note explores compelled speech
and compelled authorization in relation to the First Amendment. In light of the
Supreme Court’s precedent, this Note explores the FBI’s reasoning for
compelling Apple’s assistance in gaining access to seized phones, and Apple’s
justifications for resisting those orders. Finally, this Note argues that the
government violates Apple’s First Amendment rights by compelling them to
create a backdoor to its software encryption because it is both compelled speech
and a compelled affirmation. Finding otherwise would have severe implications
for the future of Americans’ personal privacy and security.

27. Jorge R. Roig, Decoding First Amendment Coverage of Comput. Source Code in the Age
of Youtube, Facebook, & the Arab Spring, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 319, 325–27 (2012).
28. See generally Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal
Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 1277, 1282–85 (2005) (considering arguments differentiating speech and conduct as speech);
R. George Wright, What Counts as Speech in the First Place?: Determining the Scope of the Free
Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1221, 1251 (2010).
29. 2 MELVIN F. JAGER, Trade Secrets Law § 9:12 (Oct. 2016 ed.); Roig, supra note 27, at
327–28; see also Katherine A. Moerke, Free Speech to a Machine? Encryption Software Source
Code is Not Constitutionally Protected “Speech” Under the First Amendment, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1007, 1017–19 (2000).
30. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding “New Hampshire may
not require appellees to display the state motto”); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943). The Supreme Court recognized that “speech does not lose its protection
because of the corporate identity of the speaker,” indicating that Apple’s speech is still guaranteed
protection. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986)
(citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
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I. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ELUSIVENESS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM
OF SPEECH
The United States Constitution was ratified in 1788 and “is the supreme law
of the United States.”31 In addition to providing governance guidelines for the
role of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches, it set forth the
relationships and rights between different states and the federal government.32
Arguably, the most important and controversial part of the Constitution, today
and at ratification, is the Bill of Rights, which contains the rights of the People.33
Five of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the People by the Bill of Rights
are established in the First Amendment. The First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”34 The
Framers did not initially think these rights needed to be explicitly stated;35
however, based on the expansive case law of the First Amendment it can now
be argued otherwise.
Despite being ratified in 1788,36 the Constitution remains the governing
document followed by the United States today. While the language contained
in the text remains the same, the meaning of those words has been expanded,
narrowed, and applied in many different contexts.
One provision that has evolved significantly is the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment that provides “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech. . . .”37 Over time the courts have been faced with the issue
of what qualified as “speech” when the framers passed the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court did not hear many First Amendment or freedom of speech
cases during the 100 years following the Bill of Rights’ ratification because a
majority of “federal judges [found] that the Bill of Rights [did] not apply to the
states.”38 Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment ultimately led to an
increase of freedom of speech cases tried in federal courts during the Twentieth
Century.39 This proliferation of freedom of speech issues continues in the courts
today.
31. The Constitution, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/constitution
(last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
32. Id.
33. See generally Wright, supra note 28, at 1219–21 (touching on constitutional
controversies, which stem from the document’s dearth of terminological definition); see also The
Constitution, supra note 31 (“[T]he Bill of Rights contains rights that many today consider to be
fundamental to America”).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. See The Constitution, supra note 31 (“One of the principal points of contention between
the Federalists and Anti-Federalists was the lack of an enumeration of basic civil rights in the
Constitution”).
36. Id.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38. First Amendment Timeline, THE FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, http://www.first
amendmentcenter.org/first-amendment-timeline (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
39. Id.
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A. The Expansion of the Definition of Speech in the Technology Era has Not
Clarified Any Existing Uncertainty, it has Only Created New Ones.
For two centuries courts, judges, and scholars attempted to focus the definition
of “speech” within the context of the First Amendment.40 When it comes to
determining the meaning of speech, there are varying opinions of what the First
Amendment actually protects.41 Despite this variance, it has been determined
that “[e]ven dry information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic
expression, has been accorded First Amendment protection.”42 As technology
continues to develop, courts face situations where this technology is using or
creating a language, which may or may not be considered speech.43 These
technological advancements, especially in regards to computer coding,
prompted courts to address whether computer code is or is not considered
speech. As courts issue decisions on computer code cases, a common factor is
their focus on the information that the code conveys.44
The Sixth Circuit found in Junger v. Daley that the First Amendment protects
computer source code.45 In Junger, a professor sought injunctive relief on First
Amendment grounds to enable him to distribute encryption software through his
class website.46 To address the First Amendment claim, the court evaluated
whether the code Junger wanted to post on his website had speech-like
qualities.47 While the case was in the District Court, the government
distinguished source code from object code as it applies to First Amendment
protection.48 Source code is expressed in a type of coding language, which can
be understood by people with relevant experience.49 Object code is the computer
40. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Moerke,
supra note 29, at 1010–18 (providing a preliminary overview of specific types of speech and
conduct that have historically been protected by First Amendment Jurisprudence in addition to the
analysis of when courts found government “abridging” the freedom of speech).
41. See generally Wright, supra note 28, at 1218–20 (explaining the need for a comprehensive
analysis to determine what actually counts as speech under the First Amendment).
42. Universal City Studios, Inc., 273 F.3d at 446.
43. See generally Moerke, supra note 29, at 1018–20, 1024–27 (discussing cases regarding
source and object code as well as encryption in relation to the First Amendment).
44. Id. at 1025–27 (detailing how courts determined whether computer coding constituted
speech based on the coded information’s expression of ideas, like other forms of protected
communication).
45. Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 482 (6th Cir. 2000). The lower court “found that
encryption source code is not sufficiently expressive to be protected by the First Amendment[;]”
however, after oral arguments, the 6th Circuit “reverse[d] the district court and remand[ed] this
case for further consideration.” Id.
46. Id. at 484.
47. Id. at 484–85.
48. Id. at 483 (explaining source code is a set of instructions written in “a specialized
programing language, such as BASIC, C, or Java”); see also Roig, supra note 27, at 327 (indicating
additional types of “language” in which source code can be used for communication, including
“C++, Fortran, COBOL, Python, Perl, and Java”).
49. Junger, 209 F.3d at 483.
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instructions that direct a computer through a sequence of 0s and 1s.50 The issue
with this distinction is that source code must be transferred into object code for
a computer system to understand it.51 The issue became whether source code,
which is what the encryption software was, was guaranteed First Amendment
protections.52
In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit referenced a Supreme Court holding that “‘all
ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance’ including those
concerning ‘the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts’ have the full
protection of the First Amendment.”53 The Court went further to explain that
First Amendment protection also extends to symbolic conduct, including
conduct that is considered expressive and functional.54 In looking toward
Supreme Court decisions, the Sixth Circuit ultimately decided that “[b]ecause
computer source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information
and ideas about computer programing . . . it is protected by the First
Amendment.”55 The Sixth Circuit found that source code contains both
expressive and functional features, which complicates the determination of First
Amendment protection.56 However, the court did not address the level of
judicial scrutiny to be applied because Junger needed standing “to bring a facial
challenge” to the statute that prohibits him from posting the encryption code on
his website.57 In a similar case to Junger, the District Court in Bernstein v. U.S.
Department of State found that encryption code, which required the use of a
computer source code, is considered speech.58
While the court in Junger considered the distinction between object and
source code to determine the First Amendment, the court in Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley59 conducted a different analysis but reached a similar
conclusion regarding code as speech. The court in Universal City Studios first
determined that “communication does not lose constitutional protection as
‘speech’ simply because it is expressed in the language of computer code.”60
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 484.
53. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
54. Id. (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)) (“This protection is not reserved
for purely expressive communication. The Supreme Court has recognized First Amendment
protection for symbolic conduct, such as draft-card burning, that has both functional and expressive
features.”).
55. Id. at 485. The court also analogized computer code to musical scores, noting that while
many people cannot read musical compositions, musicians prefer to communicate through their
music. Id.; see also Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N. D. Cal. 1996).
56. Junger, 209 F.3d at 484.
57. Id. at 485.
58. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1436 (“For the purposes of First Amendment analysis, this
court finds that source code is speech.”).
59. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001).
60. Id.
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The Second Circuit briefly addressed source and object code when it determined
that the distinction was not as relevant as the court suggested in Junger, asserting
that the readable nature of code by programmers qualifies it as communications
protected by the First Amendment.61 Thus, an inquiry into “the ease with which
[computer code] is comprehended” becomes irrelevant in determining whether
First Amendment protects code.62
The court further found “a programmer might communicate through code: to
another programmer” and that limiting the First Amendment protection afforded
to code “would impede their exchange of ideas and expression.”63 Taking its
analysis a step further, the Universal City Studios court contemplated the scope
of the First Amendment protection in regards to the code’s usage and purpose.
While the petitioners argued source code should be treated as pure speech, the
court did not agree.64 The Second Circuit decided that code in this case was a
combination of non-speech and speech based on the functional and expressive
elements.65 Unlike a recipe or blueprint that serve as instructions in specific
fields, “computer code can instantly cause a computer to accomplish tasks and
instantly render the results of those tasks available throughout the world via the
internet.”66 The scrutiny that applies to computer code as speech is less relevant
to the topic of this Note, but the Second Circuit’s holding that “computer code
conveying information is ‘speech’ within the meaning of the First Amendment”
is analytically critical for determining computer code’s constitutional
protection.67
B. Despite the Vague Definition and Spotty Application of the Term “Speech,”
Protection Against Compelled Speech is More Definite.
Although the Court continues to grapple with interpretation of the word
“speech,” it remains steadfast that the purpose of the First Amendment is to
protect speech. Justice Jackson famously discussed a main concern of the First
Amendment in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.68 Writing
for the majority, Justice Jackson held that the forced salute of the American flag

61. Id. at 446. The court emphasized that “the ease with which a work is comprehended is
irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry.” This supports the court’s notion that the mere prospect of
a programmer being able to understand such code makes it communicative, and is thus considered
speech, regardless of its complex nature. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 448–49.
64. Id. at 451.
65. Id.
66. Id. The court concedes that human interaction may be something as small “as a single
click of a mouse,” but nonetheless requires that computer code be evaluated based on its functional
and expressive elements. Id.
67. Id. at 449–50; see also 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1122 (2017).
68. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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in the classroom was a constitutional violation of the First Amendment.69 Justice
Jackson went on to state, “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official . . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox . . .
or force citizens to confess by words or act their faith therein.”70 This decision
was the first of many dealing with conduct as compelled speech under the First
Amendment.
In Wooley v. Maynard,71 the Court considered compelled speech when Mr.
Maynard and his wife sought relief because they found a New Hampshire law
requiring license plates to display the state motto to be unconstitutional.72 The
Maynard’s believed the New Hampshire motto, “Live Free or Die,” to be
morally, religiously, and politically against their beliefs as Jehovah’s
Witnesses.73 The Supreme Court held “the right of freedom of thought protected
by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”74 The Court found that
forcing an individual to publicly display an ideal that he or she finds
fundamentally unacceptable violates that individual’s Constitutional rights.75
The Court asserted that the government may not restrict what the People say and
further, that the government may not compel what “protects” the People–that is,
“the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority.”76
When the government compels speech, it “invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control.”77
The Court in Wooley then determined whether the state had a convincing
reason to justify such compelled actions.78 After considering the proffered
governmental interest for enforcement of this statute, the Court began its
conclusion by reasserting a previous holding, “even though the governmental
purpose [was] legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued . . .
when the end can be more narrowly achieved.”79

69. Id. Justice Jackson opines that the forced salute in this case not only exceeds the school
board’s authority, it “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.” Id.
70. Id.
71. 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633–34).
72. Id. at 707–08.
73. Id. at 707.
74. Id. at 714 (referencing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633–34).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 715 (referencing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642). The Court noted the importance of
protecting varying viewpoints of all of its citizens, even those contrary to the majority, and the
government must act consistent with such principles. Id. at 715.
77. Id. at 715 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
78. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716.
79. Id. (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)). The Court went on to hold
that “where the State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some,
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The Court later recognized the limitations placed on the government when
compelling corporations to speak in a manner inconsistent with the company’s
business principles and viewpoints. In Pacific Gas and Electric Company v.
Public Utilities Commission of California,80 the Court held that requiring Pacific
Gas and Electric Company to distribute or carry a message it fundamentally
disagreed with was unconstitutional.81 The Pacific Gas and Electric Company
was required to carry the message of the Public Utilities Commission in a
newsletter that it distributed monthly to customers in their bill.82 The Court
found that corporate entities cannot be compelled to make statements that they
disagree with83 because the right to speak also provides the right not to speak, or
in this case, publishing a message it disagrees with.84
C. Existing Law has Taken Protection Against Compelled Speech Further, and
Grants Protection Against Compelled Oaths or Affirmations
The Court further expanded First Amendment protections against compelled
speech in Speiser v. Randall.85 This case dealt with a California tax exemption
form, which allowed World War II veterans to receive a tax break so long as
they provided an oath or affirmation that they would not advocate overthrowing
the Federal or California state government.86 Legal action ensued when some
veterans were denied the exemptions because they submitted the forms without
their oath or affirmation.87 The veterans who were denied the exemption
brought suit claiming the required oath or affirmation was a violation of their
First Amendment rights.88 The Court found that under those facts, requiring a
claimant to provide an oath or affirmation was unconstitutional.89
Overall, First Amendment jurisprudence provides that computer code is
speech, regardless of the type of scrutiny applied to the actual information being

such an interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the
courier for such message.” Id. at 717.
80. 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986).
81. Id. at 18. Carrying this message not only “burdens appellant’s First Amendment rights
because it forces appellant to associate with the views of other speakers, [but also] because it selects
[these] other speakers on the basis of their viewpoints.” Id. at 20–21.
82. Id. at 6–7.
83. Id. at 16 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (noting
that speech made by a corporate entity is still granted First Amendment protection despite the
characteristic of the speaker)).
84. Id.
85. 357 U.S. 513, 513–15 (1958).
86. Id. 514–15.
87. Id. at 515.
88. Id. The lower courts in this case did not allow the Veterans to take the exemption because
they refused to complete the oath portion of the forms. The Supreme Court of California affirmed
the lower courts’ decisions, and rejected the constitutional arguments asserted by the veterans. Id.
at 515 n.1.
89. Id. at 527–30.
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conveyed. Thus, individuals cannot be compelled to create computer code
because that would be considered speech. The law also illustrates that requiring
a person to make an oath or affirmation is a form of compelled speech, and is
thus per se unconstitutional.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF A MORE INCLUSIVE DEFINITION OF SPEECH IN THE
TECHNOLOGY ERA INCREASES AS AN ACT OF TERRORISM LEADS TO THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COMPELLING A COMPANY TO “SPEAK”
AGAINST ITS WILL.
Following the events of the December 2nd massacre, the FBI conducted its
investigation in a manner consistent with a terrorist attack on United States
soil.90 The FBI seized an iPhone 5C, manufactured by Apple, pursuant to a valid
search warrant for a black Lexus IS300 that was issued on December 3, 2015.91
The iPhone was owned by the San Bernardino County Department of Public
Health, who gave authorities consent to search the device which was used by
Farook under his employment.92 In conducting its search, the government
sought any pertinent information regarding the shooters involvement in the
massacre, including others they may have communicated with regarding
planning and execution.93
Despite collaboration with Apple, the FBI was unsuccessful in searching the
device because the iPhone was protected by a “user-determined, numeric
passcode” and the phone’s operating system had an “auto-erase function.”94
This function would permanently destroy any information on the phone after

90. Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in
Search, at 2–3, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search
Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016)
(No. 15-0451M), 2016 WL 680288 [hereinafter Gov’t’s Application for Order Compelling Apple
to Assist]; see also Michael S. Schmidt & Richard Pérez-Peña, F.B.I Treating San Bernardino
Attack as Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/
us/tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html (indicating that Tashfeen Malik’s Facebook post pledging her
“allegiance to the Islamic State” led the FBI to “treat[] the massacre as an act of terrorism.”).
91. Gov’t’s Application for Order Compelling Apple to Assist, supra note 90, at 2–3. The
FBI obtained Mr. Farook and Ms. Malik’s electronic devices, including their computers and
phones, believing they would “provide the best hope for reconstructing their communications and
motives.” Schmidt & Pérez-Peña, supra note 90. FBI Director James Comey indicated that they
were “going through a very large volume of electronic evidence . . . that these killers tried to destroy
and tried to conceal from us.” Id.
92. Gov’t’s Application for Order Compelling Apple to Assist, supra note 90, at 3–5.
93. Id. at 4, 19. As part of its investigation, the FBI conducted searches on the “digital devices
and online accounts of Farook and Malik” via multiple warrants. Based on these searches and the
resulting information, the FBI believed that there was “relevant, critical communications and data
on [the locked iPhone from] around the time of the shooting . . . [that] cannot be accessed by any
other means known to either the government or Apple.” Id.
94. Id. at 3–5; see also Volz & Hosenball, supra note 8 (demonstrating that the FBI was
unable to access the locked phone after two months because of the encryption on the phone, which
has been a persistent challenge for local law enforcement and national security investigators).
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entering ten incorrect passcodes.95 Apple has, on numerous occasions, assisted
law enforcement in executing search warrants to obtain “unencrypted file
content[s] from phones without [use of] the passcode.”96 However, Apple
developed new software that was installed on the iPhone seized by the
government.97 Apple asserted several times that its new software is written
differently, and a program to provide access without the passcode does not
exist.98
Despite Apple’s assertions, the government filed an application for an order
to compel in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, seeking the court to order Apple’s assistance in executing a search
warrant to unlock the phone.99 More specifically, “the government request[ed]
that Apple be ordered to provide the FBI with a custom signed iPhone Software
(“IPSW”) file, recovery bundle, or other Software Image File (“SIF”) that can
be loaded onto the [iPhone].”100 The government cited the All Writs Act as
authority to compel Apple to assist.101 In pertinent part, the government claimed
that “[p]ursuant to the All Writs Act[102], the [c]ourt has the power, ‘in aid of a
valid warrant, to order a third party to provide nonburdensome technical
assistance to law enforcement officers.’”103 Sheri Pym, U.S. Magistrate Judge,
granted the government’s order pursuant to the All Writs Act on February 16,
2016, which included a provision allowing Apple five business days to respond
to the order if Apple determines compliance with the order to be unreasonably
burdensome.104

95. Gov’t’s Application for Order Compelling Apple to Assist, supra note 90, at 3.
96. Id. In a post answering common consumer questions, Apple clarified that, “[f]or devices
running the iPhone operating systems prior to iOS 8 and under a lawful court order, we have
extracted data from an iPhone.” Answers to your questions about Apple and security, supra note
11.
97. Gov’t’s Application for Order Compelling Apple to Assist, supra note 90, at 3–6. To
protect phones from more frequent and sophisticated cyber-attacks, Apple “built progressively
stronger protections into [its] products with each new software release, including passcode-based
data encryption.” Answers to your questions about Apple and security, supra note 11.
98. See generally Gov’t’s Application for Order Compelling Apple to Assist, supra note 90;
see also Emily Field, Apple Says it Cannot Unlock New Devices for Law Enforcement, LAW360
(Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/716435/apple-says-it-can-t-unlock-new-device
s-for-law-enforcement (“[T]here [is] no technical way [Apple] could comply with a government
request to unlock and extract user data from a pass code-protected smart device if it’s running the
most up-to-date operating system, although it could possibly crack an older phone.”).
99. Gov’t’s Application for Order Compelling Apple to Assist, supra note 90, at 2–3.
100. Id. at 3–5.
101. Id. at 1–3.
102. All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
103. Gov’t’s Application for Order Compelling Apple to Assist, supra note 90, at 11 (citing
Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1979)).
104. In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on
a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401, *1–
2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).
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Apple filed a motion to vacate the order to compel on February 25, 2016.105
Apple was concerned that “‘[j]ust this once’ and ‘[j]ust this phone’ . . . [will lead
to] multiple other applications for similar orders.”106 Furthermore, Apple
expressed concern that “[o]nce the floodgates open, they cannot be closed, and
the device security that Apple has worked so tirelessly to achieve will be
unwound without so much as a congressional vote.”107 In refuting the order,
which Apple vigorously opposed, Apple claimed that “[t]he All Writs Act . . .
which the government bases its entire case, ‘does not give the district court a
roving commission’ to conscript and commandeer Apple in this manner.”108
Apple stated that “[t]he order would violate the First Amendment” as the code
sought by the government is “compelled speech and viewpoint discrimination in
violation of the First Amendment.”109 Apple further asserted that decisions
regarding protecting the personal safety and privacy of consumers “[are] for
American citizens to make through the democratic process” rather than through
the courts.110
After Apple filed its motion, tech industry leaders expressed their support of
Apple in the encryption battle and filed legal briefs with the court on March 3,
2016.111 These companies recognized the importance of Apple’s argument
against usage of the All Writs Act as well as Apple’s argument regarding
violation of free speech.112 A common assertion throughout these briefs was the
need for legislation to adequately address encryption and all of its related issues,
as opposed to letting courts make a fragmented body of law through case-by-

105. Apple, Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 13, at 1.
106. Id.; see also Roberts, supra note 16. If it were left up to the District Attorney in
Manhattan, New York, Apple’s assistance in unlocking phones would not just be a one-time
occurrence. Noting that the number of locked iPhones reaching his office recently quadrupled and
gaining a way into these phones is crucial because “rape and murder cases are going unsolved
because investigators can’t access Apple’s phones.” Roberts, supra note 16.
107. Apple, Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 13, at 1.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 32.
110. Id. at 35. Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, suggested that the encryption discussion should be
decided on Capitol Hill where national security and privacy interests could be decided
appropriately. Claire Zillman, Apple’s Tim Cook Says the iPhone Encryption Debate Should Shift
to Congress, FORTUNE (Feb. 22, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/02/22/apple-ceo-tim-cook-fbiiphone/. He also asserted that “Apple would ‘gladly participate’ in . . . a commission or other panel
of experts on intelligence, technology, and civil liberties, to discuss the implications for law
enforcement, national security, privacy, and personal freedom.” Id.
111. Finkle & Volz, supra note 7. Supporters included Amazon, Box, Cisco Systems, Dropbox,
Evernote, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, Nest, Pinterest, Slack, Snapchat, Whatsapp, and
Yahoo. Id.; Robert Hackett, Big Tech Companies Rally Behind Apple, FORTUNE (Mar. 3, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/03/03/tech-companies-rally-behind-apple-fbis-case-threatens-fabric-ofinternet/.
112. Hackett, supra note 111. Many companies who support Apple agree that the government
cannot “force companies to create new technology.” Id.
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case decisions.113 Many industry entities desired for a solution “that applies
equally to all holders of personal information,” while allowing “tech companies
[] to have the ability to build and design their products . . . [without] the
government mandating” the manner in which companies must go about doing
that.114 To accomplish the requests of all interested parties, decisions must be
made clear on underlying legal issues to allow legislation to move forward.
III. SPEECH IS STILL SPEECH, REGARDLESS OF THE LANGUAGE IT IS SPOKEN.
The issue of whether compelling a company to write a computer program
providing the government with access to information on its devices violates the
First Amendment has never been addressed. Before the courts could rule on the
merits of Apple’s case regarding the San Bernardino massacre and the iPhone in
question, the government found an alternative way to access the information on
the cell phone.115 However, just because the government no longer needs
assistance to circumvent encryption software such as in this case, that does not
make this issue an anomaly.116 In fact, since the battle between the FBI and
Apple became public, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr. claims there

113. Id.; see also Alina Selyukh, The Apple-FBI Debate Over Encryption: A Year After San
Bernardino and Apple-FBI, Where are we on Encryption?, NPR (Dec. 3, 2016, 1:00 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/12/03/504130977/a-year-after-san-bernardi
no-and-apple-fbi-where-are-we-on-encryption. Tech industry leaders are not the only ones
expressing support for legislation, rather than judicial action, addressing encryption and privacy. A
few months after the San Bernardino attack, FBI director James Comey commented:
[T]his case . . . highlight[s] that we have . . . new technology that creates a
serious tension between two values we all treasure––privacy and safety. That
tension should not be resolved by corporations that sell stuff for a living. It
also should not be resolved by the FBI, which investigates for a living. It
should be resolved by the American people deciding how we want to govern
ourselves in a world we have never seen before.
Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James Comey, FBI Director Comments on
San Bernardino Matter (Feb. 21, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbidirector-comments-on-san-bernardino-matter.
114. Finkle & Volz, supra note 7. Many of Apple’s supporters asserted the same arguments as
Apple did in its motion to vacate. This included the improper use of the All Writs Act as a means
for the government to accomplish the desired outcome, the “slippery slope argument,” and
arguments about setting dangerous precedent. Hackett, supra note 111.
115. Laurie Segall, Jose Pagilery, & Jackie Wattles, FBI Says it has Cracked Terrorist’s
iPhone Without Apple’s Help, CNNMONEY (Mar. 29, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/28/
news/companies/fbi-apple-iphone-case-cracked/.
116. See generally In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search
Warrant Issued by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 374–76 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Lichtblau & Benner,
supra note 10; see also Kevin McCoy & Kevin Johnson, U.S. Demands Apple Unlock Phone in
Drug Case, USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/04/08/just
ice-moving-forward-separate-apple-case/82788824/ (explaining that the Department of Justice is
pursuing legal action against Apple, even after the disposition of the legal battle regarding the San
Bernardino massacre, to obtain its assistance in accessing an iPhone involved in a New York City
Drug Conspiracy case).
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are currently 423 Apple devices that are part of investigations that cannot be
cracked.117
The scope of this Note limits the analysis to the legality of the court’s original
Order to Compel while considering First Amendment concerns of compelled
speech and compelled affirmations.118 In this case, the order requires Apple to
create new software to get around their encryption software, and then add its
“digital signature,” both of which are violations of the First Amendment.
A. Not the Threshold, but a Consideration: is the Software Program Object or
Source Code Speech?
Apple asserts that the government’s order violates the First Amendment by
compelling speech,119 which is consistent with previous holdings. In Junger, the
court held that “[b]ecause computer source code is an expressive means for the
exchange of information and ideas about computer programing, . . . it is
protected by the First Amendment.”120 The Junger court relied on the
undisputed fact that encryption source code can convey information and that it
can be read and understood by individuals familiar with programing language
for informational purposes.121 Similarly, in In re of the Search of an Apple
iPhone,122 the code sought by the FBI had the same expressive values. The FBI
sought a code for software that removes security features and that additionally
creates code within the operating system to bypass the encryption.123 The
possibility that this code can be understood and interpreted by anyone with
proper experience supports the assertion that, like the code in Junger, the code
sought by the FBI is source code, warranting First Amendment protection.
In further support of source code’s expressive value, Apple highlights that
development of the code sought by the FBI presents a threat to data security due
to the likelihood that people other than Apple and the government will obtain
the code and access consumer information.124 More specifically, Apple is
concerned with hackers obtaining the code. With this information, hackers could
successfully bypass Apple’s encryption and security features to gain access to
iPhones.125 The possibility that another person could understand the code is
consistent with the court’s analysis in Universal City Studios, which deemed
117. Roberts, supra note 16.
118. In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on
a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401, at
*1–3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).
119. Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 13, at 2.
120. Junger, 209 F.3d at 485; see also Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426,
1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (analogizing music and mathematical equations to computer code).
121. Id. at 483.
122. Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 13, at 1–2.
123. Id. at 2–3.
124. Id. at 1–2; Cook, supra note 11.
125. Cook, supra note 11; Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 13, at 1–2, 17.
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source code to be speech, requiring its protection.126 Apple’s fears alone justify
and support the assertion that the code sought by the government has expressive,
speech-like values demanding protection under the First Amendment.
B. The Government Cannot Compel Apple to Write Code Because it is
Considered Speech
Apple correctly asserts that the government cannot compel it to create code
based on First Amendment precedent. In Wooley v. Maynard, the Supreme
Court held “the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment
against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all.”127 The Court held that forcing an individual to publicly
display an ideal which he or she finds fundamentally unacceptable violates that
individual’s constitutional rights.128 Apple dissented on several occasions in this
case, including in a message to its customers and in its Motion to Vacate the
Order.129 In its message to customers the company states that “[w]e have no
sympathy for terrorists” but went on to give its reasons why it fundamentally
contests the government’s demands.130 The letter refers to Apple’s compliance
“with valid subpoenas and search warrants” that Apple is capable of assisting
with.131 Apple claimed that “[t]he government is asking Apple to hack [Apple’s]
own users and undermine decades of security advancements that protect [its]
customers.”132 The government’s inability to cite precedent or otherwise justify
the expansion of its authority supports Apple’s opposition. As justification,
Apple argued that “this demand would undermine the very freedoms and liberty
our government is meant to protect.” Apple opposes the order because it does
not believe in assisting the United States government to overreach its
authority.133
The strong language that Apple used indicates that, like the citizens of New
Hampshire in Wooley,134 Apple is opposed to creating this backdoor for the
government. Consistent with the holding in Wooley, forcing an individual, or
company in this case, to display to the public an ideal that is fundamentally

126. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446, 449 (2d Cir. 2001).
127. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
128. Id. at 715.
129. Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 13, at 2–3; Cook, supra note 11.
130. Cook, supra note 11.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Apple also expressed concern for this decision’s ramifications, such as surveillance
of Apple devices recording conversations or tracking a user’s location. Answers to your questions
about Apple and security, supra note 11.
134. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
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unacceptable effectively violates his constitutional rights.135 Thus, the
government’s compulsion order effectively violates Apple’s rights.
C. The Government is Also Prohibited from Compelling Affirmations in
Regard to Speech
To take Apple’s argument a step further, even if the code itself is not
considered speech, thereby rendering the argument moot, there is another
argument to be made against compelled speech through affirmations. While the
software the FBI requested is one form of speech, the digital signature that Apple
would need to put onto that software in order for it to be functional is also a form
of speech. The iOS system, which runs on the iPhone in question, was created
with several layers of protection to ensure the highest possible level of security
to consumers.136 In order for a program to run on the iOS system, it must be
“‘signed’ cryptographically by Apple using its own proprietary encryption
methods.”137 The signature certifies that the program is authentic.138 The
signature, in a way, certifies that Apple approves the program and that it is
consistent with Apple’s standards and ideals as a company.139 Similar to the
government in Speiser, the requested order would require Apple to “provide the
FBI with a custom signed iPhone Software (“IPSW”) file . . .” specifically
requiring Apple to sign the software the government intends to use.140 In
Speiser, the court found that it was unconstitutional to require veterans to submit
an oath or affirmation in order to receive a tax exemption because it compelled
the veterans to speak.141 In the present case, the government is also requesting
unconstitutional speech. It is requiring Apple to place a digital signature on
software Apple does not agree with, which is a compelled affirmation, and is
unconstitutional.

135. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765, 776–77 (1978) (noting that
corporate speech is still granted First Amendment protections); id. at 714; see generally Cook,
supra note 11.
136. See generally Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 13, at 5–6, 32; Answers to
your questions about Apple and security, supra note 11.
137. Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order, supra note 13, at 32.
138. Id. (noting without this authentication, the code could not operate on the device).
139. Kim Zetter, Apple May Use a First Amendment Defense in that FBI Case. And it Just
Might Work, WIRED (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apple-may-use-firstamendment-defense-fbi-case-just-might-work/. Nate Cardozo of Electronic Frontier Foundation
asserted that Apple’s forced signature of the software sought is compelled speech. He asserted that
“[i]n the computer security world the digital signature is affirmation that not only is this code
genuine, but it’s intended . . . [and] is represented as coming from [the entity providing the
signature].” He further asserts that “[i]f Apple signs this [software tool], it’s the computer version
of Apple saying, ‘[y]es this is us; yes we meant to do this; and yes it’s a genuine representation of
our will.’” Id.
140. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528–29 (1958); Gov’t’s Application for Order
Compelling Apple to Assist, supra note 90, at 7–8 (emphasis added).
141. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 528–29.
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Consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Pacific Gas,142 the action
sought by the FBI in this case violates Apple’s First Amendment rights. In
Pacific Gas, the Court found that when the company distributed a newsletter
with specific additions and viewpoints, it appeared as though the company was
endorsing, supporting, or affirming the views and information distributed in that
pamphlet.143 Similarly, by requiring Apple to create a software program and
requiring Apple to sign it, the government is forcing Apple to assert to its
customers that it supports the creation and use of such a program.144 Such an
order is unconstitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
Apple’s motion to vacate the order compelling Apple to assist agents in a
search on First Amendment grounds is consistent with established precedent.
The uncertainty in distinguishing different types of code, source or object, and
the protections associated with those distinctions need resolutions to ensure that
no constitutional rights are violated. Although the Supreme Court has not yet
addressed the issue of compelling creation of software to bypass encryption,
Apple’s arguments address issues that are likely to reach the Court in the near
future. Yet, courts may not be the best place to decide this matter. As
technology rapidly advances, America needs to carefully consider future
implications that compelling such speech might have on First Amendment law
and on the rights of citizens.

142. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986).
143. Id. at 15–16.
144. Zetter, supra note 139.

